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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Bowen et al. (collectively the "Bowen plaintiffs") appeal 
from a January 13, 1998 order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting a 
motion by Giant Eagle, Inc. for a declaration that Giant 
Eagle and Shapira et al. (collectively the "Giant Eagle 
defendants") had not violated a settlement agreement with 
the Bowen plaintiffs and for enforcement of that agreement. 
See In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. Action No. 92-1938 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1998), mot. for recons. denied, (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 3, 1998). Because the district court lacked subject 





In the summer of 1992, Phar-Mor, Inc. announced that 
it would take a $350 million accounting charge to cover 
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losses that had resulted from alleged fraud committed by 
certain Phar-Mor employees. See In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., Docket No. 959 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, Feb. 17, 1993) (transfer order). Phar-Mor filed for 
bankruptcy shortly thereafter, and a number of lawsuits 
were filed by dissatisfied investors. The dissatisfied 
investors at issue here, collectively known as the"Rule 
144A purchasers," bought $110 million of Phar-Mor stock 
in a $112 million private placement offering in October of 
1991. The Rule 144A purchasers, each of which filed its 
own complaint in the Phar-Mor multidistrict litigation, are 
actually four separate groups of plaintiffs: the T. Rowe Price 
plaintiffs, the MFS plaintiffs, the Bowen plaintiffs, and 
Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). The Bowen 
plaintiffs, who had invested approximately $83 million in 
the private placement offering, filed a securities fraud 
action against numerous parties, including Phar-Mor and 
the Giant Eagle defendants,1 in the Northern District of 
Illinois. Pursuant to a February 17, 1993 order by the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the case was 
transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania under 
28 U.S.C. S 1407 and consolidated with related cases. In 
1995, the Rule 144A purchasers settled individually with 
the Giant Eagle defendants.2 On August 4, 1995 Giant 
Eagle entered into a settlement agreement (the "Settlement 
Agreement") with the Bowen plaintiffs in which Giant Eagle 
agreed to pay the Bowen Plaintiffs 9.09È/dollar invested, an 
amount which totaled greater than $7.5 million. The 
Settlement Agreement contained a "most favored nations" 
provision which stated that if the Giant Eagle defendants 
settled with any other Rule 144A purchaser on more 
favorable terms, i.e., greater than 9.09È/dollar, Giant Eagle 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Bowen plaintiffs' complaint reveals that Giant Eagle was sued 
because of its status as a controlling entity. This control was manifested 
in two principal ways: first, the majority of Phar-Mor's directors were 
directors of Giant Eagle, and second, Giant Eagle's wholly owned 
subsidiary, Eagle-Delaware, owned over 40% of Phar-Mor's voting shares 
during the relevant period. 
 
2. The T. Rowe Price plaintiffs settled on January 27, 1995, the MFS 
plaintiffs settled on February 15, 1995, and Allstate settled on November 
13, 1995. 
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would pay the Bowen plaintiffs based on those more 
favorable terms. On August 4, 1995, the Pennsylvania 
district court approved the Settlement Agreement and 
dismissed the action against the Giant Eagle defendants. 
The brief order by the district court read in relevant part: 
 
       AND NOW, this 4th day of August, 1995, upon the 
       Motion of Plaintiffs Ivan Bowen, et al. (the "settling 
       Plaintiffs") and Defendants David S. Shapira, Irwin W. 
       Porter, Gerald E. Chait, Stanley Moravitz, Norman 
       Wiezenbaum, Donald M. Robinson, Farrell Rubenstein 
       and Jonathan Kagan (the "Director Defendants"), it is 
       hereby ORDERED that (1) the settlement documented 
       in the August 4, 1995 Settlement and Release executed 
       on behalf of the Settling Plaintiffs in favor of the 
       Director Defendants and others (the "Settlement") is 
       hereby approved; (2) the Director Defendants, Charity 
       Imbrie, Giant Eagle, Inc., Giant Eagle of Deleware, Inc., 
       Corporate Partners, L.P., Corporate Offshore Partners, 
       L.P., and Lazard Freres & Co. are hereby dismissed 
       with prejudice from this lawsuit pursuant to the terms 
       of the Settlement, each party to pay its own costs . . . . 
 
In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. Action No. 92-1938 
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1995) (emphasis added). 
 
Following the dismissal of the Bowen plaintiffs' action, 
Giant Eagle paid the Bowen plaintiffs the agreed 
9.09È/dollar. After the Giant Eagle defendants had settled 
with all of the other Rule 144A purchasers, the Bowen 
plaintiffs requested information concerning the settlement 
agreements to determine whether or not they should receive 
additional funds under the most favored nations clause of 
the Settlement Agreement. Alleging that the Giant Eagle 
defendants refused to provide sufficient information for 
them to determine whether the most favored nations clause 
had been violated and alleging breach of this clause, 
eighteen of the seventy original Bowen plaintiffs sued the 
Giant Eagle defendants in Illinois state court on September 
26, 1997. This action was removed to the Northern District 
of Illinois where it is currently pending. 
 
In response to the Illinois action, on October 6, 1997 
Giant Eagle alone filed a motion in the Pennsylvania district 
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court that had initially approved the Settlement Agreement. 
This motion (the "motion to enforce") sought a declaration 
that the Giant Eagle defendants had satisfied their 
obligations under the Settlement Agreement and requested 
that the district court "enforce" its dismissal order of 
August 4, 1995. The Bowen plaintiffs responded by 
arguing, inter alia, that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider the motion. In a January 13, 
1998 order, the district court granted Giant Eagle's motion, 
holding that the Giant Eagle defendants had not breached 
the most favored nations clause and by "enforcing" its 
dismissal order of August 4, 1995. See In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., Civ. Action No. 92-1938 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 
1998). The court did not address the Bowen plaintiffs' 
arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction. In a one- 
sentence March 3, 1998 order, the court denied the Bowen 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. See In Re Phar-Mor, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. Action No. 92-1938 (W.D. Pa. March 3, 
1998). The Bowen plaintiffs appealed to this court. We have 




Whether the district court possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction is an issue of law which this court reviews de 
novo. Cf. Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 
1996); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 
The Bowen plaintiffs argue that the district court 
improperly exercised jurisdiction over Giant Eagle's motion 
to enforce under Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. 
of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). The Bowen plaintiffs 
contend that under Kokkonen, the phrase "pursuant to the 
terms of the Settlement" in the dismissal order did not 
confer subject matter jurisdiction over enforcement of the 
Settlement Agreement because it was insufficient to 
incorporate the Agreement into the dismissal order. The 
Bowen plaintiffs further contend that the mere fact that the 
district court approved the Settlement Agreement is also an 
insufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction over its 
enforcement. Giant Eagle responds that the district court's 
language was sufficient to incorporate the terms of the 
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Settlement Agreement into the dismissal order. Giant Eagle 
further asserts that even if this language is ambiguous, the 
court should defer to the intent of the court that entered 
the dismissal order. We understand Giant Eagle to argue 
that the district court's intent to retain subject matter 
jurisdiction was expressed when it ruled upon Giant Eagle's 
motion to enforce. 
 
We agree with the Bowen plaintiffs that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Giant Eagle's 
motion to enforce. In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court held 
that when a federal district court dismisses an action 
pursuant to a settlement agreement, that court lacks 
jurisdiction to enforce that settlement agreement unless the 
obligation of the parties to comply with the settlement 
agreement is made part of the dismissal order or there is an 
independent basis for exercising jurisdiction. See Kokkonen, 
511 U.S. at 381-82. The Court provided explicit guidance 
as to the two ways in which a district court can make 
compliance with a settlement agreement part of a dismissal 
order, thereby ensuring that it would have subject matter 
jurisdiction to enforce a breach of that agreement: 
 
       The situation would be quite different if the parties' 
       obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement 
       agreement had been made part of the order of 
       dismissal--either by separate provision (such as a 
       provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement 
       agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the 
       settlement agreement in the order. In that event, a 
       breach of the agreement would be a violation of the 
       order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the 
       agreement would therefore exist. That, however, was 
       not the case here. 
 
Id. at 381. 
 
It was also not the case here. In view of Kokkonen, it is 
clear that the parties' obligation to comply with the 
Settlement Agreement was not made a part of the dismissal 
order. First, the dismissal order does not contain a 
provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the Settlement 
Agreement. Second, the district court did not incorporate 
the Settlement Agreement or any of its terms, including the 
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most favored nations clause, into the dismissal order. The 
phrase "pursuant to the terms of the Settlement" fails to 
incorporate the terms of the Settlement Agreement into the 
order because "[a] dismissal order's mere reference to the 
fact of settlement does not incorporate the settlement 
agreement in the dismissal order." Miener v. Missouri Dep't 
of Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1995). As 
the Bowen plaintiffs correctly indicate, this view is shared 
by several of our sister circuits which have adhered strictly 
to Kokkonen in determining whether language in a 
dismissal order is sufficient to incorporate a settlement 
agreement. See Scelsa v. City Univ. of New York, 76 F.3d 
37, 41 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that "action is dismissed" is 
insufficient); Miener, 62 F.3d at 1128 (holding that "[a]ll 
matters . . . hav[e] been settled and resolved" is 
insufficient); Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1432-1433 (holding that 
"action has been settled" is insufficient); Lucille v. City of 
Chicago, 31 F.3d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
"entered in accordance with" the settlement agreement is 
insufficient). While the district court did approve the terms 
of the Settlement Agreement, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that mere approval of a settlement agreement does not 
confer subject matter jurisdiction to enforce that 
agreement. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381 ("The judge's 
mere awareness and approval of the terms of the settlement 
agreement do not suffice to make them part of his order."); 
see also Miener, 62 F.2d at 1128 ("We do not believe the 
district court's approval of the settlement agreement is 
sufficient to confer ancillary jurisdiction under Kokkonen.") 
 
Giant Eagle further argues that even if the phrase 
"pursuant to the terms of the Settlement" is ambiguous, we 
should defer to the expressed intention of the district court, 
since it is that court which is in the best position to 
determine whether it intended to retain jurisdiction over 
enforcement of the settlement agreement. We disagree, 
because under Kokkonen, unexpressed intent is insufficient 
to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Giant Eagle cites 
Scelsa in support of its argument, but in that case, as here, 
the court concluded that the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement 
agreement because "[f]irst and most importantly, the 
Dismissal Order neither expressly retains jurisdiction over 
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the Agreement nor incorporates its terms." See Scelsa, 76 
F.3d at 41 (emphasis added). The intent of the district court 
judge was considered only as a tertiary consideration, and 
was cited in support of the court's conclusion that the 
district court had not retained jurisdiction. See id. at 42. 
Giant Eagle's citation of Ford v. Neese is not persuasive, 
because the Seventh Circuit in that case held that the 
district court never "lost" jurisdiction over enforcement of 
the settlement agreement. See Ford v. Neese, 119 F.3d 560, 
562 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The implication is that jurisdiction 
had never been lost--that it had been retained from the 
outset, in 1978, and never relinquished--to enable the 
settlement agreement to be enforced."). 
 
The parties' remaining arguments principally address 
whether the district court denied Bowen due process when 
it ruled on Giant Eagle's motion to enforce. Because we 
conclude that the district court lacked subject jurisdiction 





Because the parties' obligation to comply with the 
Settlement Agreement was not made part of the dismissal 
order, and the district court did not otherwise possess an 
independent basis for jurisdiction, the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Giant Eagle's motion 
to enforce. We thus vacate the district court's order and 
remand with instruction to dismiss. 
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